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Summary findings
Fong and Lokshin model the household demand  for  market care and the decision to engage  in paid
child care, the mother's participation  in the labor force,  employment.
and her working hours in Romania.  Their model  * The  level of household nonwage income  has little
estimates the  effects of the price of child care, the  effect on maternal  employment and the demand for child
mother's wage,  and household income on household  care.
behavior relating to child  care and mothers working  In addition to facilitating women's work,
outside  the home. They find that:  kindergartens  and creches  appear to provide  educational
* Both the maternal  decision to take a job and the  and social benefits for children. Close to half the children
decision to use out-of-home  care are sensitive to the  in these facilities have mothers who do not work.
price of child care.  A decrease  in the price of child care  Further research  is needed to assess the cost and nature
can increase the number of mothers  who work and thus  of these benefits and to determine the appropriate  roles
reduce  poverty in some  households.  for the private and public sectors in providing, financing,
* The potential  market wage of the mother has a  and regulating such  services for working and nonworking
significant positive  effect on the decision to purchase  mothers.
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The research in this paper addresses the problems faced by families with children in a transitional
economy and the impact that reforms in the child care system can have on the well-being of children
and the employment of  women in Romania. Early childhood development programs have been shown
to have substantial physical health, nutrition, and family benefits as well as major cognitive and social
benefits for children.  A large body of research from diverse cultures provides strong evidence that
most early childhood development programs of relatively good quality have meaningful short-term
effects on cognitive ability, early school achievement, and social adjustment (Reynolds et al. 1997).
Ensuring healthy child development is not only an investment in a country's future workforce
and economic capacity, but it is also an important mechanism for making use of the human capital
vested in women of working age. In addition, the provision of  child care services facilitates women's
employment and can reduce economic disadvantages for women and their children by increasing their
income.  A better understanding of child care choices and their effects on women and children  in
different  socioeconomic  groups  is  therefore  needed  to  inform  policy  discussions  on  female
employment and child care in the context of the economic transition.
In  the  pre-transitional  period  women  in  Romania,  as  in  other  Communist  countries,
participated in the labor force on a level higher than in industrialized market economies. Romanian
women also worked full-time the whole year round, and there was very little part-time employment.
Despite a decline of 12 percent  since 1990, the rate of women's labor force participation remains
relatively high in Romania, and averaged over 75 percent for women of ages 25-49 in 1997 ( Cace
et al.)
Such a high level of involvement of women in the economy would not have been possible
without the existence of a wide range of government-subsidized  child care programs, in the form of
creches, kindergartens, and after-school programs. Under central planning government resources were
devoted to providing appropriate care for children in center-based programs from the earliest months
of life until they entered primary school.
1The fundamental restructuring ofthe economic system toward a market economy that started
in 1989 led to dramatic changes in Romania's socioeconomic  environment and strained the existing
system of social protection and state-subsidized  institutions. A more than 26 percent drop in gross
national product (GNP) from 1989 to 1994 (Milanovich 1997) resulted in a widening budget deficit,
shrinking government programs, and an erosion of family subsidies  (child benefits and child care
allowances).  Between  1989  and  1997,  child benefits  were  reduced  to 65  percent of their  pre-
transition levels (Zamfir 1998).
Most countries in the region have seen a decline in preschool child-care services during the
transition. In Romania public child care services declined in quality and parents were asked to carry
a larger share of the cost already in the last decade of the socialist regime. Responsibility for creches
for children ages 0-2 has been removed from enterprises and transferred to the Ministry of Health,
while kindergartens for ages 3-6 remain the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The number
of creches declined from 847 in 1989 to 573 in 1995, and the enrollment of children (2 months to 3
years of age) in creches dropped by half. At the same time, new legislation (law  120/97) provided
65 percent of her previous salary to a mother who wished to care for her child during its first year of
life. This was recently extended to age two, and many mothers working in the public sector prefer to
stay home on child-care leave when children are young.
The number of  children (3 -6 years old) in kindergartens has declined by nearly one third since
1989  (Zamfir  1998).  According  to UNICEF (1997)  the proportion  of children  in kindergartens
dropped  from  63.3  percent  in  1989  to  55.1  percent  of relevant  population  in  1996.  Although
attendance has declined, the growth of  private institutions has afforded greater choice in kindergartens.
Kindergarten  fees doubled in relation to the average wage in 1990 but have since declined
roughly to the pretransition level of 10 percent (Fong 1996). Fees are subsidized, and users currently
pay about 51 percent of the total cost of keeping their children in child care facilities. (Zamfir, 1999)
For some households, particularly single-parent households, the unemployed, and those subsisting on
pensions, the fees for child care may nevertheless present a serious problem.
Until recently, there has been little research on the economics of child care outside of the
United States. In recent years a certain amount of research on child care has been conducted  in the
nations of Western Europe, where (as in the United States) growing numbers of women with young
children  have  been  entering  the  workforce  (see,  for example,  Gustafsson  and  Stafford,  1992;
2Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt 1996; Van Den Brink and Groot i 997). To date only a very limited
amount of  research has been conducted on child care and women's labor market activity in transitional
economies. Lokshin (1999) has investigated the effects of  the price of  child care, the mother's wage,
and household income on household behavior and well-being in Russia.
The research reported in this paper is prompted by the complexity of the problems faced by
families with children in the transition and by the significant impact that reforms in the child care
system  can have  on the  political  and  economic  environment,  and on the well-being  of future
generations in Romania. Where child care represents an important mechanism to overcome social
inequality experienced by women and children, a better understanding of child care choices and their
effects  on women  and  children  in  different  socioeconomic  groups can  serve  to inform  policy
discussions about the contexts in which economic changes enhance or compromise child development.
Based on recent progress in the theory of demand  for child care and women's labor supply in the
United States, this paper follows the work of Blau and Robins (1988), Ribar (1992, 1995), Connelly
(1992), Michalopoulos, Robins, and Garfinkel (1992), Kimmel (1995), Averett, Peters, and Waldman
(1997)  in jointly modeling households'  decisions about child care and mothers' decisions about
entering the workforce. The research is based on household survey data from the Romanian Child Care
and Employment Survey  (RCCES) and data on child care providers from the Romania Child Care
Facilities  Survey (RCCFS).  These two  surveys were  conducted by the World Bank in the same
geographical areas during the same time period and were designed to allow matching data on child
care fees and child care quality collected from kindergartens and with the households surveyed in  the
same communities.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe the data and present descriptive
statistics  on the main factors  that influence household  behavior.  Subsequent sections  show the
development  of the theoretical model, give details of the empirical model, discuss the conceptual
issues involved in estimating a consistent model of household child care choice and labor supply. This
is followed by a presentation of the results, and an analysis of the estimation results and simulations
in Section 6. A discussion of the policy implications and a summary of the findings conclude the
paper.
32. Data and Variables
This research is based on data from the Romania Child Care and Employment Survey (RCCES)
conducted  by  the  World  Bank  in  April  1999.  The  nationally  representative  sample  contains
information on 1,505 households with children younger than 12 years of age, and 403 households with
children of age 0-6 in kindergartens and/or creches.
The initial sample of households for the survey was identified from a stratified three-stage,
multistrata  sample of residential  addresses. In the first stage, the total sample was proportionally
divided into several subsamples, using two strata based on the region (  1 regions) and the size of  the
locality  (rural,  small  town with  population  under  50,000,  medium-size  town  with  population
50,000-200,000, large town with population over 200,000; and Bucharest).  In the second stage, the
geographical area units were randomly selected within each subsample. In the third stage, households
in the area units were selected using a random route (maximum of 10 households per sampling point).
The  data  set  includes  information  on  the  individual  members  of  these  households,
household-specific information, and community-level data. It also contains information on the child
care arrangements made for each child in the household, the amount of time spent by each child in
formal and informal child care, and the amount of money paid for formal child care during the week
ofthe survey. The part ofthe questionnaire administered to each member ofthe household yields data
on how much time each household member spent looking after children and was active in the labor
market,  as well  as  information  on their  monthly  wages.  The  second part of the questionnaire,
administered to one respondent per household  on matters that affected the household collectively,
yields information on non-wage household income and on household composition.
Parallel  to the household survey,  a Romanian  Survey of Child  Care  Facilities  (RCCFS)
collected information about 316 kindergartens and creches that were attended by the children from the
household sample  interviewed  by RCCES.  The questionnaire,  which was administered to  every
facility manager, provides detailed information  on fees and types of care.  With these surveys it is
possible to match households with the child care prices they face in the area in which they live and
purchase care.
43. Descriptive  Statistics
Child care  facilities
The  system  of preschool  care  in  Romania  is  regulated  by  Government  Decision  (Romanian
Government 1991). According to this regulation kindergartens and nurseries should provide, free of
charge, children's medical assistance, instruction, and education, with the required expenses covered
by the budget of the state central administration.
Parents contribute up to 75 percent ofthe cost of  food for children in child care. Their monthly
contribution is set as a percentage of total monthly household income, adjusted by the number of
children the household has enrolled in the child care facility. Fees are calculated according to three
income  brackets.  Households with total gross income below  12,000  leis (in 1991  prices) pay 50
percent of the total fee for the first and 40 percent for the second child in the facility. Parents with
income between 12,000 and 20,000 leis pay 75 and 55 percent of the fee for the first and the second
child. Finally, households with total income above 20,000 leis pay the full fee for the first child and
70 percent of fee for the second.
The average fee per-child in the daily program was 173,300 leis per month for the households
surveyed.  In some  facilities  parents  are also  required to pay for the development  and  academic
activities  provided.  In our sample,  54 percent of child care facilities managers  reported that they
charge for such activities and that the amount ofthis additional fee is about 20 percent ofthe base fee.
Since  1989 there has been a decline in the use of state-provided child care facilities, which
has led to underutilization of kindergartens and creches. Table 1 shows the occupancy rates i.e. the
ratio ofthe facility capacity to the actual number of children enrolled in the program. These occupancy
rates are lower than the numbers from other sources. For example, Evans et al. (1995) reports an
occupancy rate of 94 percent at the end of 1993. This discrepancy may indicate that enrollment in child
care facilities in Romania is falling faster than the decrease in the number of  kindergartens or creches.
5Household child  care arrangements
Placing children in child care in Romania is common practice, whether the mother is working or not.
About half of the children in the sample were in formal child care, half at home (Table 2). For formal
child care, however, more than half of the child care places went to children whose mothers were not
working.  In other words, formal  child care is used as both to allow the mother to work outside the
home, and as a benefit in its own right for the child.  For women who work, however, child care
remains an important factor in allowing them to work, and 62.9 percent of working mothers put their
children in formal child care, while 37 percent  still keep the child at home.
The dual function of child care to allow mothers to work and to benefit pre-school children
is also evident if we look at the role of other members of the household (Table  3). The presence of
other relatives in the household influences the choice of child care. Of the 81.0 percent of working
mothers with other household members who were at work, over 50 percent put the children in child
care and the remaining  31 percent kept them at home. When other household members do not work,
child care is still used as a benefit for the child, and twice as many of these households put children
in child care as keep them at home.
This dual function becomes especially clear for households with many children. For mothers
who do not work, those with one child are more likely to keep the child at home than put it in child
care. Those with two or more children, however, are slightly more likely to put them in formal care
than to keep them at home. (Table 4).
Mother 's labor  force participation
The level of mothers'  labor force  participation declines  with household  size.  For example, in the
households of two (single mother family) or three (single mother with two children or two adults with
one child), about 42 percent of  mothers work. This number declines to 32 percent for the households
with five family members and falls even further for larger households (Table  5).
A possible explanation for this pattern is that the mother's decision to participate in the labor
market is determined by the total household income. Large households have higher total income, and
thus the potential contribution from the mother's wage income to total household income is relatively
6lower than that contribution in smaller households. Large households more often can find it optimal
for the mother to stay home with children and thus to provide better-quality care and perhaps other
domestic services as well than households  with fewer members.
The decision for mothers to work also depends on the number of children in the household.
Among households with more children, the advantage of the mother's staying home is higher than for
households with only one child. Table 6 presents the proportion of  households with working mothers
by the number of children. Mothers' productivity at home increases with the number of  children in the
household relative to their productivity in the labor market because of economies of scale that can
exist in home-provided care. For households with only one child, more than 40 percent of mothers
work. For households with 2 and 3 children, the proportion of mothers in the labor force drops to
about 3  0 percent, and this proportion declines to 20 percent for households with four or more children.
A special section of  the RCCES questionnaire was devoted to questions about mothers' own
perceptions of child care and its effects on maternal employment. Among mothers of small children
in Romania, 65.5 percent say the price of  child care influences their decision to work or not to work.
Only a little more than one-third of the mothers consider the lack of kindergartens  and creches an
obstacle to employment, however. When asked about the major factors that influence the decision to
put their children in kindergarten, mothers report that the quality of care provided and the convenience
of the facility's operating hours are the most important. At the same time, 20 percent of Romanian
households with small children would not use formal child care arrangements even if  they were free.
4. Theoretical Model
The analysis applies to households with children under 7 years of age. Three forms of child care are
available to households  in Romania:
*  informal (home provided and free) care provided by the mother
*  informal child care provided by other household members
*  formal (government  or market provided)  child care
For households with children and two parents, the husband is considered a potential provider of  free
child care. In a household with a single mother who has no relatives living with her, it is assumed that
7any  informal  child  care  is  provided  by  children  themselves  or relatives  who  live  outside  the
household.
We  classify  child  care  arrangements  into  six categories  defined  by combinations  of the
mother's employment status, mode of care (formal and informal), and employment  status of other
household members (Table 2).
The theoretical model used in this paper is based on the assumption that household members
make choices  about their  consumption  of child  care  quality,  of market  goods,  and  of leisure.  A
household's decisions about the quality of child care it wishes to obtain and about the amount of time
each member of the household can work are motivated by the desire to achieve the highest level of
household welfare.
We also assume that households pay a flat fee for child care services.  The fees charged by
kindergartens are a function of the quality of care provided by the facility and the total level of child
care prices within the locality.  This important assumption needs further explanation.
As we noted, how much Romanian households are charged for child care depends  on total
household income. Parents of children attending the same kindergarten can pay different fees. Thus,
the prices of child care are endogenous  to household behavior and in particular to the household
members'  labor supply decisions.  Certain households may decide not to send their mothers to the
labor market because this would increase their income and put such households into a higher child
care price bracket.  The endogeneity of child  care prices complicates the model substantially.
There  are two ways to deal  with the problem.  We  could estimate  the structural model of
household behavior with a kinked budget constraint under an assumption of endogeneity of  prices of
child care, or we could ignore the fact that households with different incomes pay different prices for
child care and assume that every household whose children attend the same kindergarten pays the same
flat fee.
Estimating the correct structural model under assumptions of a kinked budget constraint is
complicated.  Even  in simple  cases,  using  the  instrumental  variables  for  identification  may  be
criticized on the basis of invalid exclusion restrictions. At the same time, ignoring the differences in
fees paid by households would introduce measurement  errors in our estimation.
Most of the recent literature on child care treats the price of child care as exogenous.  The
assumption of exogenous child care prices may underestimate the effect of child care prices on poor
8Romanian households. Yet despite the disadvantages of the simpler method, we still choose it over
the more complicated estimation of the structural model, as the ability of such a model to provide any
additional insights has yet to be established. In this paper we identify the effect of changes in the price
of care through the regional differences  in child care fee levels.
In the one-period utility maximization problem the household chooses its consumption of a
Hicksian composite  good G, the average per-hour quality of child care Q, the leisure time of the
mother L,W  and  the leisure  time of other household  members Lo subject  to its budget and time
constraints. The household utility function is assumed to be twice-continuously differentiable and
quasi-concave:
Max U = U(Lm, Lo, G, Q).  (1.1)
The total quality of child care Q is the weighted  sum of the exogenous  quality of the child care
provided by the mother Qm ,  the quality of child care purchased on the market Q, and the exogenous
quality of child care provided by relatives Qo:
QQm=mL+Qp(Hm-To)+QoTo. (1.2)
The budget constraint includes total household expenditures on child care as a function ofthe number
of children in the household, of the per-unit quality price of child care, of the quality of formal care,
and of the time spent by the children in care:
G = E + Wm Hm + WoHo-N Pq Qp (Hm-ToO),  (13)
where E is the exogenous nonwage household income, Hm is the mother's actual work time, Ho is the
other household members' actual work time, N is the number of children in the household, Pq is the
exogenous  price per unit of quality of formal child care,  To  is the amount of time spent by other
household members on child care,  Wm is the market wage available to the mother, and Wo indicates
the market wage available  to the other household members.
Finally, the model specifies - under the assumption that children require constant care - the
time constraints  affecting the mother, the other household members, and the children:
Lm  Hm =Lo +Ho +To  =1  (1.4)
Hm-To 20  (1.5)
O < To,LHo 0 ,Lm,H  < 1  (1.6)
9The household optimizes the labor supply of its members, chooses the optimal quality of child care
for each of the six possible child care/employment mode states, and then chooses the state with the
highest utility.
5. Empirical Model
The empirical model used in this paper consists of a discrete choice equation for the child care mode
and mother's labor supply, an equation for a mother's hours at work, and an equation for children's
hours in paid care.
For the discrete choice model, the utility that the ith household derives from the choice of the
jth discrete alternative can be expressed in linear form as:
Q j  =  Qy + ey  = Xjj6j  + Z,1yrj + ,i'  j  = 0,...,5  (2.1)
where Q,j  is the utility for household i choosing statej, X, is the vector ofthe household characteristics
that  affect  the  choice  of the  ith household  and  that do  not  vary by  state,  Zij  is the  vector  of
outcome-specific  variables,  pi  and  y  are  vectors  of unknown  parameters,  and  E  is  a random
disturbance  that  reflects,  among  other things,  unobservable  attributes  of the  alternatives.  The
probability that household i chooses statej is then:
Pr(j)  =  Pr[Q,2  > Q4i  for  any j ￿  q]
= Pr[scj, -Esqi  > Xj(I 3q  i -ji)  + Z1 j(Yqi - Yji)  for  any  j  ￿  q]
The supply function for mother's hours at work and the demand function for hours spent by children
in formal care can be specified in linear form as:
ri  ki  hours mother works
Hi  = akXi +6pkZ 1+  1k,  where k =  (2.2)
2  hours children spend in paid care
Here, H,  is the continuous dependent variable k associated with household  i in statej. In the first
continuous outcome equation, Hi' is the number of  hours that a mother supplies to the labor market (if
she works), and Hi2 is the number of hours spent by children in formal child care facilities in those
states  where formal child care  arrangements  have been chosen. Xi and Z,  are the vectors of the
variables  defined above,  (Pk and ak are vectors of unknown parameters,  and (,k  is an error term with
mean zero.
10The theoretical model assumes that a household makes simultaneous decisions about the mode
of child care it wishes to use, the labor supply of each of its members, the amount of time that each
family member spends on child care, and the amount oftime that their children spend in formal care.
All ofthese decisions are determined by exogenous characteristics ofthe family and individual family
members, both observable and unobservable.
Several estimation issues need to be discussed.  First, the error terms in the discrete (e) and
continuous (4) equations  may be correlated  across states and among each other. The correlation
across states is a correlation among disturbances in the state-specific  indirect utility functions (e.g.,
2.1). If, for instance, a mother's participation  in the labor force is determined  by, among the other
factors, some unobservable taste for work, this unobserved factor will be part of et for states in which
the mother is employed  (j = 2,...,5).  There  may be a correlation  between  the  disturbance in the
equation for a household's choice of discrete states and the equation for the amount oftime that women
supply  on the labor market.  Similar  correlations  can exist for the equations  that determine the
following: (i)  labor supply decisions of  the other family members, (ii)  time spent on child care by the
mother and the other family members,  and (iii) household child care arrangements.
To account for possible error correlations in a tractable way, we impose a factor structure on
the disturbances in equations (2.1) and (2.2):
Cy=  :-+-pV;  4  ,I = Xi +  TVi;  4 2 =i  +,;Vi  (3.1)
where  i,  is an independent  extreme  value  error,  and  Xi,  and yi are  independent  normal  random
variables.  V  is a factor.  This factor is unobservable  variables that influence the choices made by
households and that is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. p, , and s  are factor loadings that
represent the effect of the factor V  in each equation.
The  system of equations  (2.1-2.2) with the  error structure  (3.1)  can be estimated by the
Semi-Parametric Full Infornation Maximum Likelihood (SPF1ML) method developed by Laird (1978)
and Heckman and Singer (1984) and applied to simultaneous equations by Mroz and Guilkey (1992)
and Mroz (1999).
The above specification assumes that each household has the same choice set of child care
arrangements and labor force participation  modes. However,  a significant proportion of Romanian
families do not consider formal care a possible care alternative for their children. The RCCES asks
whether households would consider putting their children in formal care if the care were free and of
11better quality. One-fifth of  the households with small children answered that they would not send the
children to formal child care facilities. For these groups of families, the conditional contribution of
the discrete  outcome equation to the likelihood  function is calculated based on a restricted  set of
possible  forms of care, i.e.,  that there are no formal care  arrangements  in the choice set of these
households (equations  5.1  and 5.2):
Households that would use all forms of care  Households that would not use formal care
ePPjXit +  PjIl I￿  +  Pjj2V2MA  eP  IX3  +  PklV)  +  PkI2V2h
Pr(Y,1  =  A VI  mV2kt)=  Pr(Y,,  =  Al VI.  IV2kt P  3
+ E  ePkXi+PkivIk+P  2v2mnt  1 +  ePkX  +  PkIVI  +Ph2v2kV
k=1  k=1
Pr(Y},  = 0VI.m,V 2kt)A  1  Pr(MY,,  = OIVimV 2kt)NA  1
1 +  E  ePkXi  PklVlk  +  Pt2V2w,,-  1 +  e3kXi+Pk1Vl,  +  Pkt2V2k
k=1  k=1
(5.1)  (5.2)
where Pr(Yi, =jlvI,v2 k) A  is the probability that household i (which has access to formal child care
facilities)  chooses  state j at time t conditional  on factors  VI  and  V 2, and Pr(Yj, =jjvlm,v 2 k)NA  is the
probability for those households that prefer not to use formal care arrangements.
Conditional on the Vs, the likelihood contributions ofthe continuous outcome equations (2.2)
are:
1  H' ~x.i a1-zl  y I  r,vm
I  i2  _x2a2  _z2y2  V
Pr(H,l  lvm.)  =  1-  p(  2  al  (6.2)
where Hi,'  and H,, 2 are the dependent variables in the continuous outcome equations (2.2), ¢ is the
probability density function of standard normal distribution, and a' j,  and a2i, are the square roots ofthe
variances of the error terms in equations (2.2).
Thus, the semi-parametric log-likelihood function for the system of equations (2.1-2.2) with
the error structure (3.1-3.3) is:
NM
3 =  ln(  ZJ  Pr(1  = j(vm)  Pr(Y = jl v.)'  Pr(H,'I  vm)Pr(Hj2 vm)]),  (7)
i=l  I
where N is the number of households in the sample.
12Choosing a priori numbers of points of  supportM, the log-likelihood function 9 is maximized
over a's, f's, y's, l's, C's, Ps, and v's. For identification purposes, the two points of support are
normalized to equal 0 and 1, respectively.  The number of points of support is increased  until the
difference in the log-likelihoods of consequent maximizations  satisfies the convergence criteria.
The joint distribution of the error terms (3.1-3.3)  is unknown, so the sample statistics of the
estimates cannot be derived analytically. It is feasible to estimate the covariance  matrix 8 of the
coefficients in the model (2.1-2.2) by inverting the Hessian matrix of the second derivatives of the
log-likelihood function Z.
Dependent variables
The dependent  variable  for the discrete  outcome  equation  is defined according  to the possible
combinations of amother's employment status, employment status of other household members, and
the mode of child care, which are shown in Table 2. These combinations  are:
(0) - the mother does not work and stays at home with her children;
(1)-  the mother does not work and children are in kindergarten;
(2) - the  mother works,  the other household  members  also  work,  informal child care
arrangements are used;
(3) - the mother works, the other household members  do not work, informal child care
arrangements are used;
(4) - the mother works, the other household members work, formal child care is used;
(5)-  the mother works, the other household members do not work, both formal  and informal
care arrangements are employed.
Table 7 shows the distribution ofthe dependent variables for continuous outcome equations, i.e., the
time that mothers spent working and the time that children spent in formal care. Both continuous
outcomes are observed only among the sample of working mothers or among the sample of children
in formal care.
13Explanatory  variables
The definitions and descriptive statistics  for the explanatory  variables  in the system of equations
(2.1-2.2) are presented in Table 7.  Several key variables of interest are discussed in detail below.
Price  per quality unit ofchildcare fP,).'  We estimate the quality-adjusted price of outside-home
care using the method suggested by Blau and Hagy (1998). RCCFS collected extensive information
about the characteristics of  the child care provided and the fees charged by creches and kindergartens.
These data are used to estimate a model of  fees for formal child care facilities. The quality-adjusted
price of an hour of child care is determined by a location-specific  hedonic price equation:
Pi =  ,i  +  6 Xi  + ei
where Pi is the price of the formal care at location  i, xi is a vector of variables that represents  the
characteristics of the facility, ,  is a vector of coefficients, and s, is an error term. In that specification
it  can be interpreted as a market-specific  quality adjusted hourly price of child care.
We  use the quality-adjusted  price of care  to be  able  to  compare  the effects  of price on
household behavior for facilities that offer different quality of care. For example, suppose one facility
offers several developmental programs and has a low teacher-child ratio. In other words, that facility
provides a high quality of child care but charges a relatively high price for its services. The other
institution does not offer such high quality of care, and the price it charges is low.
Directly comparing the prices of  these two facilities is not possible because these prices are
charged  for different  services.  The methodology  suggested  above  allows us to adjust prices  for
difference in the quality of provided care and thus makes these quality-adjusted prices comparable.
Mother's offered wage  W  The wage rates available  to each mother have been imputed  using
Mincer's and Polachek (1974) type earning function regression with a control for selectivity (standard
Heckman  correction)2 run on a subsample of working women for whom hourly  wage data were
available. The hourly wage has been calculated as a ratio of the women's monthly earnings and the
total number of hours they worked during the month the survey was administered. In the absence of
2 Regression coefficients for the wage equations are shown in Appendix 2. For identification  in the
selection equation, we use the standard set of household characteristics  that can influence  the mother's labor
force participation  decision but are uncorrelated  with the potential  wage rate.
14data on the total amount oftime a mother had worked during the preceding month, the imputations were
made based on the number of hours worked during the week of the survey.
In the wage regression, the following explanatory variables have been used to predict mothers'
experience, her marital status, and the amount of  time she had been in her current mainjob. Imputations
are made based on the women's predicted hourly wages, with the job tenure of nonworking mothers
being equal to zero. Here the offered wage is assumed to be a wage that a mother could earn if she
were to start a new job.
Offered wages of other household members (JffLThe wage rates  available  to other household
members are calculated in a similar way to the wage rates available to mothers. Different regressions
were run to predict wages for household members of different ages and genders. After the imputations,
two methods were used to obtain the wage W0.Under the first specification the offered wage of  other
household members is equal to the lowest wage earned by any household member except the mother.
The second specification uses the average wage of  all working household members as an explanatory
variable in the model.
Nonwage household income (E): Nonwage income is measured as household monthly income from
all sources other than wage income.  This may include social  security  transfers, private transfers,
in-kind income, and income from home production. The structure of  household income changed over
the rounds ofthe survey, and certain adjustments were made to ensure compatibility ofthe income data
across all of the survey rounds.
Other explanatory variables include some individual characteristics ofthe mother such as her
age and level of  education, household demographics and size, the number of children in the household
and their  ages,  the  number  of pensioners  in  the  household,  and  the household's  geographical
characteristics.
6. Results
The results ofthe estimation ofthe system of simultaneous equations (2.1-2.2) are shown in Table 8(a)
for the discrete outcome equation and Table 8(b) for the continuous outcome equations.
15Estimated  coefficients
The estimated coefficients ofthe household child care/labor supply equation confirm the predictions
of the theoretical  model.  An increase  in the price of the unit quality of child care decreases the
probability for the  household to chose paid care (modes  1,4,  5)  and increases  the probability  of
choosing the states where children stay home. The change in the child care prices has the strongest and
statistically most significant effect on the state where the mother does not work and children are in
formal care (mode 1).
An increase in potential market wages of  the mother increases the likelihood that the mother
will participate in the labor market. The coefficient on the log of  the mother's wage is positive for all
states where the mother works, and it is statistically significant for modes 3, 4,  and 5.  Younger
mothers are more likely to work and children of  younger mothers are more likely to be in formal care.
Relative to mothers with only primary education, mothers with higher levels of education are less
likely to work and to have their children in kindergartens or creches. Households may prefer that the
mother stays home with children as higher-educated mothers can provide a higher quality of care for
their children.
Households  in the rural areas of Romania are less likely to use formal child care, and the
probability of using kindergartens and creches declines when the distance from the facility is greater
than a 20-minute  walk.
The results ofthe estimation ofthe continuous outcome equations ofthe mother's hours at work
and the hours children spent in the child care facilities are presented in Table 8(b). The coefficients
of the hours of work equation show apositive, although insignificant, effect ofthe mother's wage rate
on the number of hours the mother spent working. An increase in the wage rate of other household
members decreases the mothers'  hours at work, but mothers from the larger households work more.
Mothers with higher work tenure also tend to work longer hours. Significant differences in the hours
of work are observed among the different occupations,  where women employed in industry and in
education work longer hours than other women.
The estimation ofthe model ofthe hours that children spent in kindergarten is consistent with
the theoretical prediction results although the explanatory power of the model is weak: higher wages
ofthe mother increases the number of  hours children spend in care and an increase in the price of  care
16has a negative effect on the hours. As the assumption of exogenous prices for child care tends to
underestimate this effect, the latter may be regarded as a minimum estimate, however.
Simulations
To examine the effects of policy instruments on household behavior, we simulate how households
would respond to changes in the specific parameters used in the model. In a given simulation, a certain
value  of the variable  of interest  is assigned to all the  households in the  sample.  The  simulated
probabilities for the discrete model outcomes and simulations for the continuous models are generated
for each household at every point in time by integrating over the estimated heterogeneity distribution
and averaging  the probabilities  across the sample.  Next, the value of the variable  of interest  is
changed, and this changed value is assigned to the whole sample of the households. Then the new set
of simulated  probabilities is generated.  The effect  of the changes  in the particular  parameter  is
calculated as a difference in these simulated probabilities.
The simulated distributions of the probabilities for the discrete outcomes are shown in Table
9. A 10 percent increase in the mother's potential wage increases the rate of maternal employment.
For both states where the mother does not work (states 0 and 1, i.e. children at home or in child care),
we observe a decline The decrease is stronger in the state where the mother does not work and stays
home with children (state 0). The number of households in this category  drops by 7.2 percent as a
result of an increase in mothers' wage. Under this new policy households would also be more likely
to choose states that employ formal care arrangements.  The proportion of  households with working
mothers that would use formal care increases by 8 percent. The total effect of  the change in the wage
rate is a 10.9 percent increase in the rate of women's labor force participation together with a 4.3
percent increase in the use of formal child care facilities.
Changes  in the  price of child care would have  a smaller effect  on the level of maternal
employment and on the use of formal care. The simulated increase in the price of care by 10 percent
would result in a 1.2 percent decline in the number of working mothers and a 2 percent decrease in
the number  of households  that use creches or kindergartens.  Thus,  a policy that fully subsidized
formally provided child care could increase the rate of  women's labor force participation by as much
as 12-15 percent.
17A 10 percent increase in the potential market wage of household members other than the
mother would not have a significant effect on the household choice of child care mode or the mother's
labor  supply.  As  already  discussed,  these  should  be regarded  as minimal  estimates  due  to the
exogeneity assumption.  We also fail to discover any significant effect of the changes in household
nonwage income on household behavior. This result seems to be consistent with the findings in other
transitional  economies  (Lokshin 1999).
The Romanian results confirm those found in other countries. Table  10 presents estimated
elasticities  of female labor force participation and use of formal care for studies  conducted  in the
United States, Brazil, Russia, and Romania. Among all these studies, Romanian results show the
lowest response of women's labor force participation to a change in the price of  child care. However,
the elasticity of the use of formal care is found to be highest in Romania, indicating that child care
prices play a strong role in households'  decisions about the use of formal care.
This comparatively high elasticity ofthe household demand for child care with respect to child
care costs may be attributed to the fact that a significant proportion of the households where mother
is not working also use child care facilities.  For households with working mothers child care costs
may be seen as a fixed cost of maternal employment, i.e., for every hour the mother works she has to
pay for the cost of care. In these cases household decide to use child care facilities as a substitute for
the maternal care when the mother is at work. Any changes in the modes of care (for example a switch
from kindergarten to home care) in response an increase in child care prices may lead to substantial
changes in the labor supply ofthe household members and even to mother's exit from the labor market.
In households where the mother does not work but the child is in formal child care, on the other hand,
the decision not to use child care facilities would not have such a dramatic effect. Switching from paid
care to home care may affect developmental outcomes for the children and mother's leisure time, but
the impact on the household income is likely to be insignificant.
The low elasticity of female labor supply with respect to child care costs may be explained
by the fact the child care is subsidized for the poorest household in Romania. Child care costs can be
thought of as a fixed cost of maternal employment. For every hour the mother spends in the labor
market she has to pay a cost of children care, which decreases her effective wage. In the better-off
households  the wages earned by the mother may be significantly higher than her reservation wage,
when she would leave the labor market. Thus change  in the cost of care would not decrease the
18mother's  effective  wage  below  her  reservation  wage  in better-off  households,  but in  poorer
households, and households where the mother's education and labor market experience is low, the
situation is different. The potential market wages of the mother can earn on the market are not much
higher than her reservation wages. An increase in the cost of care could therefore lead the mother to
leave the labor market and stay home with the child. At present, however, the Romanian government
subsidizes child care for and such policies buffer the impact of the changes in care prices on the
poorest households. If the subsidy were removed maternal employment may be expected to decline,
especially for young women and women with low education, little labor market experience.
Distributional  impact of changes in price of  child care and  changes in mothers' wage rate
In the previous sections we showed the effects of various policy instruments on household behavior.
An important issue in implementing a particular policy measure is the distributional impact of the
policy.  Changes in the price of child care or the mothers'  wage rate may improve the well-being of
households  with small children, but these policies can  affect households with different  levels of
income differently.
Figure 1 presents a non-parametric estimation3 of the effect of a 10 percent decrease in the
price of child care on the mother's probability of being employed by per capita household income.
The figure indicates that the policies that decrease the costs of  care are most effective for households
with above-average incomes. The elasticity ofthe change inthe wage rate is about 0.11 for the poorest
Romanian households and reaches 0.19 for households with per capita income around 900,000 lei per
month (a 60 percent difference).  The weak responsiveness of low-income households to the change
in  child  care  price  could  be  explained  in part  by the  above-mentioned  differences  in fees  for
households with different incomes. Poor households pay only 50 percent of child care facility fees,
and the effect of changes in fees would accordingly be smaller for them.
A somewhat different picture is shown in Figure 2, which presents a non-parametric estimation
of the distributional impact of a 10 percent increase in the maternal wage on the mother's probability
of being employed. This policy is more effective  for families with lower incomes. The effect of an
3  For the graphs we used the program for locally-weighted smoothed scatter plots.
19increase in mothers'  wages is almost twice as high for the poorest households than for households
from the right side of income distribution. As a policy instrument that seeks to increase the maternal
labor force participation of low-income families,  an increase in wage rates appears preferable to a
decrease in the price of child care.
7. Conclusions
This study estimates the effects of child care costs on the labor decisions of women in Romania. The
estimation ofthejoint model ofhouseholds'  child care choices, mothers' labor supply decisions, and
household demand for formal child care confirms the predictions of the theoretical model developed
in this paper. The estimation indicates that economic incentives have a powerful effect on the work
behavior of women with children in Romania. The level of wages available to them and the costs of
child care  can  both be  expected  to affect  women's  labor  force  participation  and  labor  supply
decisions. Child care costs affect which child care arrangement households choose. When the costs
of formal care are high, this discourages households from using formal child care and increases the
number of households that rely on informal care. These findings match the subjective perceptions of
Romanian women that high child care costs and low availability are barriers to women's employment.
Government  subsidies for child care may increase the number of mothers who work, thus
increasing the incomes of  poor households and lifting some families out of  poverty. The simulations
in this paper show that measures such as subsidies aimed at reducing the costs of market child care
are effective in increasing the number of mothers who work and the number of hours that they work.
However, the effect of such policies on the poorest households in Romania is less significant.
In Romania formal child care plays the important additional role of providing pre-school
education for children, regardless of the mother's labor market participation.  While non-working
mothers are more likely to keep their children in home care than working mothers, close to half ofthe
children attending formal care have mothers who do not work. Further analysis is needed to determine
whether this is a factor of  the age of  the child, with very young children being kept at home, and older
children sent to formal care for the social and educational benefits provided by formal child care. The
nature and extent of these benefits will need to be assessed in order to determine how kindergartens
and creches can best prepare and equip Romanian children for their formal education. Further research
20is also needed to determine the roles of  the public and the private sector in the provision, finance and
regulation of such services for both working and non-working mothers.
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23Table 1: Utilization of  state-provided  child  care  facilities
Full-week  Full-day  Part-day
program  program  program
Occupancy rate (%)  82.7  80.6  86.4
Percent of facilities providing service  14.2  55.1  63.6
Source: RCCFS 1999.
Table 2: Household child care arrangements
Working mother  Non-working  mother  Both
Child at home  13.9 (110)  35.6 (283)  49.5 (393)
Child in child care  23.4 (186)  27.3 (217)  50.7 (403)
All  37.3 (296)  62.9 (500)  100 (796)
Table 3: Child care arrangements  of  working mothers
Others work  Others don't work  Both
Child at home  31.0 (92)  6.1 (18)  37.1  (110)
Child in child care  50.9 (151)  12.0 (35)  62.9 (186)
All  81.9 (243)  18.1 (52)  100 (296)
Table 4: Household  child care arrangements  by number of  children
# of  Mother working  Mother at home  All
children
0-6 years  Formal  Home  Formal  Home  Formal  Home  Total
old  care  care  care  care  care  care
1  21.3 (170)  12.8  (102)  19.1  (152)  28.5 (227)  40.5 (322)  41.3 (329)  81.7 (651)
2  2.01  (16)  1.0 (8)  7.8 (62)  6.28 (50)  9.8 (78)  7.3 (58)  17.9 (136)
3  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)  0.5 (4)  0.6 (5)  0.5  (4)  0.6(5)  1.1  (9)
4+  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)  0.0 (0)
All  23.3 (186)  13.8 (110)  27.3 (218)  35.4  (282)  50.8 (404)  49.2 (392)  100.0 (796)
24Table 5: Mothers' labor  force participation  by household size
Household  size  Percent of households  Percent of households  with
working mothers
2  1.6  41.7
3  35.9  43.4
4  33.7  37.4
5  26.7  32.1
6  8.3  28.8
7  6.9  21.8
Total  100.0
Source: RCCES
Table 6: Mothers' labor  force participation  by number of  children in the household
Number of children  Percent of households  Percent of households  with
working mothers
1  50.5  41.8
2  37.3  34.7
3  7.2  29.8
4+  5.0  20.0
Total  100.0
Source: RCCES
25Table 7. Summary statistics  for the explanatory  variables, the means and  standard  deviation.
Mean  Std. error
Log of mother's wage  6.62  0.17
Log of wage of other household  members  6.30  1.76
Mother's age  29.49  5.80
University  degree  11.05
Technical/vocational  education  20.10
Primary education  68.84
Household  characteristics
Total  household nonwage  income  382.74  563.46
Number of children  1.72  3.77
Number of pensioners  0.15  0.45
Household size  4.16  1.36
Rural regions  50.25
Town 10,000- 50,000  14.94
Town 50,000-200,000  11.30
Distance to facility:  10-20 minutes walk  34.43  47.54















Mother's tenure in months  84.39  64.31
26Table 8(a): Semi-parametric  estimation of  the discrete outcome model of household child  care choice and  women 's labor  supply
Mother works
Children at home  Children in formal care
Mother does not work,
children in formal care  Other household  Other household  Other household  Other household
members do not work  members work  members do not work  members work
Coefficient  St. error  Coefficient  St.error  Coefficient  St. error  Coefficient  St. error  Coefficient  St. error
Logaveragepriceofchildcare')  -11.38**  3.98  6.37  5.41  13.26  14.36  0.58  0.51  -12.61  9.41
Logofmother'swage  9.30  6.83  37.32  35.29  76.26*  54.11  59.56**  31.02  95.26**  40.42
Log of other household members  -0.88  0.84  5.62  4.88  -2.17  1.36  1.01  1.18  -4.01***  1.09
Mother's age  3.73*  2.13  3.56  2.79  2.72  4.45  10.48***  3.14  9.90  4.67
Mother's age squared  -4.88*  2.93  -4.82  3.84  -2.45  5.90  -14.68***  4.51  -14.76**  3.52
University degree  -1.29**  0.63  -0.81*  0.46  -2.36**  0.86  -1.54**  0.60  -2.23**  0.88
Technical/vocational  education  -0.27  0.25  -0.07  0.34  1.44*  0.71  -0.85**  0.40  1.13*  0.54
Primary education  Reference
Household characteristics
Total household non-wage income  -4.56*  2.85  -0.94  2.30  -5.05  3.44  -4.49*  2.72  2.09  3.06
Number of children  -1.28  1.56  -8.74***  2.35  -1.76  7.42  -8.28**  2.40  1.37  3.05
Number of pensioners  3.66  2.40  -3.23  3.59  20.46**  7.78  0.35  3.19  6.70  2.75
Household size  1.94  1.24  4.15**  1.49  -9.82  6,22  1.84  1.69  -2.08  2.49
Rural regions  Reference
Town 10,000-50,000  -0.68**  0.34  0.37  0.37  0.16  0.96  0.45  0.35  -0.31  0.75
Town 50,000-200,000  -0.95**  0.41  0.30  0.38  1.23  0.79  -0.49  0.42  -0.59  0.79
10-20 minutes walk  -0.48*  0.23  -0.25  0.33  0.72  0.73  0.12  0.29  1.10*  0.52
More than 20 minutes walk  -0.52  0.30  0.30  0.35  1.36*  0.77  -0.02  0.37  -1.04  1.14
Transilvania  -0.02  0.33  0.63  0.38  0.15  0.81  0.70  0.40  2.64**  1.25
Muntenia  -0.04  0.33  0.03  0.40  -0.18  0.84  1.04**  0.40  3.52**  1.25
Moldova  0.55*  0.34  0.02  0.44  -0.37  1.02  0.67  0.42  3.61**  1.26
Bucharest  Reference
Constant  -6.70  5.27  -3.94***  0.42  -6.08***  0.54  -5.87***  0.80  -7.56***  0.81
i) All variables  are normalized to be in [0,1] range
Note: The mode where mother does not work and children stay home is used as a reference;  * is significant at 10%  level; ** at 5%  level; ***  at 1%.
27Table 8(b): Semi-parametric estimation of the continuous outcome equations of  the mother 's work hours
and the hours children spend at child care facility.
Hours of work  Hours in formal care
Coefficient  Std. Error  Coefficient  Std. error
Log average price of child  care')  6.87  9.04  -53.88  36.71
Log of mother's wage  11.25  19.62  19.72  76.63
Log of other household members  -3.90**  1.67  4.34  6.83
Mother's age  1.77  3.03  1.61  12.38
Mother's  age squared  -0.03  0.04  -0.03  0.18
University degree
Technical/vocational  education  -6.34  5.90  7.43  24.18
Primary education  Reference
Household characteristics
Total household nonwage  income  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.02
Number of children  -5.43  3.81  43.23**  15.50
Number of pensioners  -2.48  5.55  27.55  22.71
Household  size  4.90*  2.77  4.56  11.39
Rural regions  Reference
Town  10,000-50,000  7.23  6.98  20.03  28.17
Town 50,000-200,000  1.30  7.82  29.83  31.79
10-20 minutes walk  1.82  5.27  2.93  21.53
More than 20 minutes walk  0.74  6.63  -4.08  26.97
Transilvania  5.57  7.62  5.26  30.55
Muntenia  3.01  7.59  18.78  30.84
Moldova  -6.07  7.85  37.79  31.96
Bucharest  Reference
Mother's occupations
Agriculture  15.57  18.22  X
Industry  46.37***  8.47  X
Construction  35.60**  18.93  X
Trade  30.78***  7.60  X
Health  23.73**  12.25  X
Education  47.54***  10.80  X
Banking  21.22  17.75  X
Other  Reference
Mother's tenure in months  0.44***  0.05  X
Constant  -105.55  124.16  80.26  476.43
') All variables are normalized to be in [0,1] range
Note:  * is significant at 10% level;  ** is significant at 5%  level;  *** is significant at 1%  level.
28Table 9: Simulation of the effects of  various  policies on the household choices of child care
mode and mother's labor supply (proportion  of households in each state)
Mother does not work  Mother works
Children home  Children in  Children home  Children in formal care
formal care
Other  Other  Other  Other
household  household  household  household
members  members  members  members
(State 0)  (State 1)  do not work  work  do not work  work
(State 2)  (State 3)  (State 4)  (State 5)
Increase in mothers 'wage rate by 10%
Sample average  0.378  0.267  0.131  0.022  0.158  0.044
Sample average+10%  0.306  0.230  0.148  0.033  0.207  0.075
Change (%)  -7.193  -3.696  1.744  1.115  4.961  3.068
Increase in child  care price by 10%
Sample average  0.375  0.261  0.128  0.020  0.174  0.042
Sample average+10%  0.395  0.258  0.117  0.018  0.177  0.036
Change (%)  1.998  -0.301  -1.102  -0.250  0.300  -0.646
Increase in other  household members wage by 10%
Sample average  0.382  0.272  0.114  0.020  0.178  0.033
Sample average+10%  0.381  0.270  0.120  0.020  0179  0.032
Change (%/e)  -0.138  -0.275  0.527  -0.051  0.059  -0.121
Increase  in household  non-wage income by 10%
Sample average  0.374  0.264  0.128  0.022  0.172  0.041
Sample average+10%  0.376  0.262  0.129  0.021  0.170  0.041
Change (%)  0.269  -0.232  0.059  -0.023  -0.131  0.059
Table IO: Comparison of  the elasticities  of  the effect of child care cost on labor  supply
Study (year)  Data  Estimated  elasticities (increase in child care cost)
Labor force participation  Use of formal care
This paper  Romania Child Care and Employment Survey  -0.17  -0.41
Lokshin  Russia Longitudinal  Monitoring Survey  -0.19  -0.11
(1999)
Cleveland, Morley,  Canadian National  Child Care Survey  -0.39  -0.2
Hyatt, (1996)
Connelly  Panel of Survey of Income and Program  -0.20  Not available
(1992)  Participation  1984,  USA
Blau and Robins  1980 Baseline Household Survey  of  -0.38  Not available
(1988)  Employment Opportunity Pilot ProLect, USA
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Figure 1: Non-parametric estimation ofthe distributional impact of a I10 percent decrease in the
price of child care on the mother's probability of being employed,  by per capita income
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Figure 2: Non-parametric estimation of the distributional  impact of a 10 percent increase in
mothers'  wage rates  on the mother's probability of being employed,  by per capita income
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